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Abstract
We analyze the causal impact of choosing for an elite high school on the probability
of obtaining a high school degree without study delay using a dataset for Belgium.
While general schools o¤er study programs in all tracks, elite schools specialize and
only o¤er programs in the academic track, preparing students for university education.
If students underperform in the academic track, they can switch to a lower track to
avoid study delay. For students in elite schools, switching also implies choosing for
another school. We account for self-selection and heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect
and derive a small and non-signicant average e¤ect. However, we nd that there is
substantial heterogeneity. Students with a high preference for elite schools experience
the most negative e¤ects, resulting in a signicantly negative average treatment e¤ect
on the treated of -11.6 %points. We show that the same group is also unwilling to
switch tracks after they entered an elite school. Despite the negative average e¤ect, we
also nd heterogeneity among the group of treated students with a substantial fraction
benetting from an elite high school.
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1 Introduction
Completing secondary education is important for later life outcomes. However, a substantial
fraction of students does not obtain a high school degree or obtains this degree after some
study delay. Among OECD countries, only 72% of young adults graduate within the the-
oretical duration of the program and 16% does not complete secondary education (OECD,
2014).
We investigate how the organizational structure of schools inuences success in secondary
education. In particular, we analyze how this structure interacts with the tracking of students
in di¤erent programs. A tracking system consists of two stages. In the rst stage, all students
start at a common program. Afterwards, students are tracked into di¤erent programs. Tracks
can often be distinguished by the way they prepare students for their life after high school
like universities (academic track) or the labor market (technical and vocational track). These
tracks often group students by their ability and preferences.
The supply of tracks within a specic school can a¤ect study decisions if students prefer
to stay in the same school. If schools o¤er programs in all tracks, tracking can occur within
the same school (within-school tracking). If schools specialize in one track, students may be
less likely to choose the optimal track if this track is not o¤ered at this school. They then
have to switch to another school and leave behind a familiar environment (between-school
tracking). If students do not perform well, they can still switch to a lower track during
secondary education. If more study options are available in the same school, it is possible
that students are more likely to choose for a program that best matches with their interests
and ability. Therefore, o¤ering programs in several tracks within a school can improve study
outcomes. On the other hand, specialization in one track can have benets in attracting a
more homogeneous peer group or specialized teachers. It could also be more e¢ cient if the
school infrastructure is very track-specic.
In this paper, we compare within- and between-school tracking within an early tracking
system. More specically, we analyze whether starting at a school that only o¤ers programs
in an academic track, inuences the probability of graduating from high school within the
theoretical duration of the program. In the rest of this paper we will refer to these schools
as "elite schools".1
We apply our analysis to Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, where students
1Similar to our denition of elite schools, Clark and Del Bono (2014) and Guyon et al. (2012) dene
an elite school as a school that only o¤ers academic programs. However, the denition of non-elite schools
di¤ers with our setting. In their contexts, non-elite schools only o¤er non-academic programs. In our setting,
non-elite schools can be general schools and o¤er both academic and non-academic programs, or specialize
in non-academic programs. Among the students attending non-elite schools, 82% attended a general school.
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are tracked into di¤erent programs around the age of 13. The rst year of secondary ed-
ucation consists of a comprehensive program and is open to all students that successfully
completed elementary education. Students can also follow this program at the school of their
choice as free school choice is legally enforced. In the following years, they specialize in a
certain program, within a specic track. Programs can be categorized into four tracks. The
academic track prepares students for academic programs (at least 4 years) at universities.2
Other tracks prepare for professional programs (3 years) in tertiary education or for the
labor market. As long as students perform well, they can choose among all programs. If
they failed some courses, they might be excluded from certain programs in the next year.
Alternatively, they may be required to repeat a year of study.
Our main nding is that there is considerable heterogeneity in the e¤ect of treatment. We
nd that students who choose for elite schools are on average worse o¤. Students who did not
start at an elite school would on average experience no e¤ect. These e¤ects can be explained
by tracking decisions. We nd that especially students with a high preference for elite schools,
are less likely to switch to another school to enroll in another track. Additionally, there is
substantial heterogeneity within the groups of treated and non-treated students. In both
groups, some students experience a positive e¤ect, while others experience a negative e¤ect
of treatment.
To establish our main ndings, we face the following two problems: (1) endogeneity be-
cause of non-random self-selection into elite schools and (2) heterogeneity in the treatment
e¤ect. We address the rst problem by using distance as an instrument for school choice.
The policy of free school choice and the large availability of di¤erent schools in the neigh-
borhood of students, make distance a reasonable instrument for school choice in Flanders.
If the treatment e¤ect di¤ers between students, which turns out to be important in our
setting, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show that the conventional two stages least squares
(2SLS) estimator is di¢ cult to interpret as, in general, it cannot be interpreted as an average
treatment e¤ect (ATE), average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATT), or average treatment
e¤ect on the non-treated (ATNT). We therefore follow Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and
allow for heterogeneous e¤ects of attending an elite school by estimating marginal treatment
e¤ects (MTEs) in a nonparametric way. These e¤ects show how elite schools a¤ect students
di¤erently. We use the MTEs to compute the ATT: the average e¤ect on students that
actually started at an elite school. The large dataset we use, allows us to precisely estimate
the ATT nonparametrically. However, in order to identify other treatment e¤ects, such as
2Although there are almost no admission standards for higher education in Flanders, the tracks students
followed in high school are very important predictors of success at these institutions (Declercq and Verboven,
2015).
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the ATE and ATNT, we impose limited functional form and distributional assumptions in
a parametric model. We also illustrate how much observable background characteristics can
explain di¤erences in treatment e¤ects. Finally, we show how a factor structure, proposed by
Aakvik et al. (2005), allows us to also identify distributional treatment e¤ects, in particular
the percentage of students who beneted and su¤ered from elite schools.
We obtain the following main ndings. Although graduating within the theoretical du-
ration of the program is more common for students starting at elite schools (77.3% versus
only 70.1% in other schools), we nd that this is not a causal e¤ect but the result of self-
selection by high-ability students. We also nd signicant heterogeneity in the treatment
e¤ect, reected in an upward sloping MTE curve. This means that students with the high-
est preference for elite schools su¤er most from it. We nd an ATT of -11.6 %points, i.e.
students who started at an elite school, experienced an 11.6 %point drop in their chances to
obtain their degree on time. However, the ATNT, the counterfactual outcome of sending all
other students to the elite school, is small and insignicant. We can therefore conclude that
precisely those students that choose for elite schools are worse o¤, possibly because they are
being pushed by their parents or they are prepared to accumulate study delay in order to
graduate from an elite school. We also nd that going to an elite school makes students less
willing to switch to other tracks. This is especially the case for students with a high prefer-
ence for elite schools. To test this hypothesis, we repeat the analysis for a di¤erent outcome
variable: the probability to switch tracks. We nd that elite schools make students less
likely to switch tracks, especially for students with the highest preference for these schools.
This conrms our hypothesis that elite schools inuence track decisions, making it harder
for students to switch to the right track.
We further investigate the heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect. We nd more negative
e¤ects for male students and students with a disadvantaged background. Finally, we show
that there is also heterogeneity within both groups of treated and non-treated students. We
nd that 8.4% of the treated students beneted from starting at an elite school, while 19.1%
of the treated su¤ered from it. The results have important policy implications. Banning
elite schools could increase the overall rate of students graduating on time from 72% to 75%.
However, the substantial heterogeneity among treated and non-treated students implies that
more gains are possible by better allocating students to both types of schools.
This paper contributes to the literature on the e¤ect of school characteristics on study
outcomes. Many studies analyze the causal impact of school characteristics on success in
secondary education.3 Similar to our study, Dustmann et al. (2016), Clark and Del Bono
3Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997) and Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) study the impact of catholic
schools. Dobbie and Fryer (2011), Deming (2011) and Deming et al. (2014) study the impact of school
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(2014) and Guyon et al. (2012) analyze the e¤ects of attending a school that specializes in
academic programs. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) also
study the e¤ect of elite schools but dene these schools on the basis of the quality of peers.
We contribute to this literature by investigating the degree of heterogeneity in the treatment
e¤ect and how it results in di¤erences between treated and non-treated students.
Another strand of the literature analyzes the impact of early tracking, see for example
Hanusek and Woessman (2006) and Pekkarinen et al. (2009). While these papers study the
impact of the age of tracking, we contribute to this literature by comparing within- and
between school tracking within an early tracking system.
Finally, we are one of the few papers that compares and directly applies the recent ad-
vances in the econometric literature on estimating treatment e¤ects proposed by Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005) and Aakvik et al. (2005). In our application, we are able to nonparamet-
rically estimate the ATT and compare it with the results of a model that uses functional form
and distributional assumptions. Imposing these assumptions gives us additional insights in
the degree of heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect.4
The paper is organized as follows. We start by providing an overview of secondary
education in Flanders and introduce our dataset. We proceed by discussing the empirical
framework in section 3 and discuss the instrument in section 4. Section 5 and 6 respectively
summarize and interpret the results. We then discuss some alternative outcome variables
to strengthen the interpretation of the results in section 7. Finally, we provide a sensitivity
analysis in section 8 and conclude in section 9.
2 Secondary education in Flanders
In this section we discuss the institutional context in Flanders and show some descriptive
statistics about enrollment and study outcomes for students choosing elite and non-elite
schools.
quality. Wiswall et al. (2014) analyze the impact of attending a STEM school and Angrist et al. (2013)
study the e¤ectiveness of charter schools.
4MTEs are usually only identied for a subset of individuals such that it is not possible to estimate ATE,
ATT or ATNT nonparametrically. See for example Doyle (2007 and 2008) and Galasso and Schankerman
(2015). Other papers rely mainly on parametric assumptions on the shape of the MTE curve or the underlying
behavioral model to improve common support or obtain su¢ ciently precise estimates (Carneiro et al. (2011),
Carneiro et al. (2016), Cornelissen et al. (2016b), Basu et al. (2007)).
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2.1 Institutional overview
Flanders is the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, located in the North. It consists of about
60% of the population of 11 million inhabitants, compared with 40% in the French-speaking
part, which is located in the South and most of Brussels5. After nishing primary school, stu-
dents enroll in secondary education, usually at the age of 12. Students can choose between
all schools in Flanders since school choice is not geographically restricted and free school
choice is law-enforced. Also capacity constraints are uncommon.6 In practice, most students
choose one of the closest alternatives. When starting at secondary education, almost all stu-
dents start in a comprehensive program. A small fraction starts at a vocational-preparatory
program. As these students often did not successfully complete primary education, we do
not consider this group and only include students who started at the comprehensive program
in our analysis.
Students follow a common program during the rst year of secondary education. After the
rst year, they can choose between programs in four tracks.7 The academic track prepares
students for academic programs in higher education (mostly 4 or 5 year programs). The
technical track and the artistic track prepare students for professional programs in higher
education (mostly 3 year programs) or the labor market. Students can also choose for
the vocational track, that prepares them directly for the labor market. Both students
preferences and study results in the rst year determine the track. If they performed well,
they can choose between all tracks. Students who fail on some courses can be excluded
from certain programs or tracks. If they fail on too many important courses, they can also
be required to repeat their year.8 While mobility between tracks is generally possible, we
observe almost only downward mobility, i.e. students going from the academic track to the
5A small minority of the Dutch-speaking part (about 10%) also lives in Brussels. There is also a small
German-speaking part in Belgium, located in the East (about 0.6% of the population).
6Capacity constraints are becoming more common in some cities. The law however protects free school
choice and prevents schools from cream skimming. If the school is capacity constrained, it must add pupils
to a waiting list and if spots become available, it must respect the order of this list.
7O¢ cially the distinction between tracks exists only from the third year on. However, at the start of the
second year, pupils decide on elective courses that prepare for a particular track. We therefore classify tracks
from the second year on.
8At the end of each year, students obtain a certicate, based on their study result. They obtain an
A-certicate if they succeeded on all major courses. They can then move on to the next year and continue
the same program. If they did not succeed for all courses, they might obtain a C-certicate which implies
that they have to repeat all courses of the previous year. There is also a third possibility: a B-certicate.
This implies that they can move on to the next year but only if they switch to a lower-ranked program.
Alternatively, they can also decide to repeat the year instead.
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technical or artistic track and from the technical or artistic track to the vocational track.9
Note that this mobility is not always due to restrictions of continuing in the same track but
often results from a choice by students or their parents because they want to avoid failing
on too many courses and thereby risk accumulating study delay in the future.
The supply of programs di¤ers between schools in Flanders. Some schools specialize
and o¤er programs in only one track, while other schools o¤er programs in more tracks.
Specialization o¤ers some benets that can help in obtaining better study outcomes like
having more homogenous peer groups, specialized teachers and more e¢ cient use of school
infrastructure. However, as studentspreferences are an important determinant of the chosen
track, studentschoices can be di¤erent in both types of schools. If schools o¤er programs in
all tracks, tracking can occur within the same school. In schools that specialize in only one
track, students have to switch schools when changing tracks. Tracking then occurs between
schools. If they do not like switching to another school, students who start at a specialized
school might not end up in the track that suits them best. It is possible that these students
are then more likely to accumulate study delay or drop out than students who start at a
school that o¤ers programs in all tracks.
2.2 A rst look at the data
We use a rich dataset provided by the Flemish Ministry of Education. We observe all students
who started at the comprehensive program10 in secondary education in the year 2003 until
200611 and follow them in secondary education. For every school year, we observe their
school12, program and study result. We also observe whether they graduated from secondary
education and whether they graduated within six or more years of studying.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all students who started at the comprehensive
9Only mobility from the vocational track to other tracks is not allowed but in general it is hard to move
upwards from other tracks too because students do not have the pre-requirements for courses of the higher
tracks.
1085% of students enroll in the comprehensive program in secondary education. 15% directly start at a
preparatory year for vocational education or in special education. We do not consider these students because
they often did not successfully complete primary school.
11Information about the residence and socio-economic background is only available in the data from 2007.
We remove pupils without information about socio-economic status or place of residence from the dataset.
We also omit pupils who drop out from public education in Flanders before 2007.
12The administrative denition of a school does not always overlap with the actual school as it is perceived
by parents and children. Large schools often have several administrative entities on the same address, while
other schools use the same administrative entity for schools in very di¤erent locations. We therefore use the
address of the campus where the pupil is located to dene a school.
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program of the rst year of secondary education between 2003 and 2006. 26.6% of all
students start at an elite school, a school that only o¤ers programs in the academic track.
Girls are slightly more likely to start at elite schools. Socio-economic status also determines
school choice. Advantaged students are more likely to start at elite schools. The most
notable e¤ect is for the educational level of the mother. 38.0% of students whose mother has
a degree in higher education start at an elite school, while this is only 14.4% if the mother
has no degree in secondary education.
In the second panel of Table 1, we represent study choices of students who completed
the rst, comprehensive, year of secondary education. Almost all students who nished the
comprehensive year in an elite school enroll in the academic track in the second year. Less
students starting at non-elite schools choose for the academic track. This can be explained
by two possible e¤ects. First, if students do not like switching to another school, students
at elite schools are more likely to enroll in the academic track because this is the only track
o¤ered at this school. Second, if students of higher ability are more likely to enroll in elite
schools, proportionally more students will start at the academic track after their rst year
in an elite school.
Finally, we also represent study outcomes for both types of schools. We consider gradu-
ating from high school within the theoretical duration of the program (6 years) as our main
outcome variable. Students who started at elite schools seem to perform better. 77.3% of
the students who started in their rst year at an elite school graduate from high school with-
out study delay, while this is only 70.1% of the students who started at a non-elite school.
We also consider an alternative outcome: graduating from high school within seven years of
studying. A substantial fraction of the students graduate with one year of study delay. If
graduating from elite schools has additional benets, such as higher success in higher educa-
tion, it could be benecial to study one year longer. We observe that students who started
at elite schools still perform better but the gap in graduation rates becomes smaller.
In general, we conclude that students choosing for elite schools have better study out-
comes but enrollment in elite schools is not random. Therefore we need to control for
self-selection to investigate the causal e¤ect of an elite school on study success.
8
Table 1: Enrollment and study outcomes in secondary education
Elite school Non-elite school
First year enrollment
All 26.6% 73.4%
Male 26.0% 74.0%
Female 27.3% 72.7%
Mother has post high school degree 38.0% 62.0%
Mother has high school degree 21.5% 78.5%
Mother has no high school degree 14.4% 85.6%
Dutch at home 26.5% 73.5%
No Dutch at home 28.6% 71.4%
High income (=not eligible for study grant) 28.6% 71.5%
Low income (=eligible for study grant) 18.7% 81.3%
Tracking after comprehensive year
Academic track 93.4% 54.9%
Technical track 5.5% 36.6%
Artistic track 0.2% 0.9%
Vocational track 0.7% 7.5%
Study outcomes
High school diploma within 6 years 77.3% 70.1%
High school diploma within 7 years 91.1% 86.6%
Note: Enrollment decisions and study outcomes are expressed as percentages of
students enrolling in secondary education between 2003 and 2006. Tracking after
the comprehensive year is expressed as a percentage of pupils who choose for
courses that prepare for the academic track.
3 Empirical framework
We study the causal e¤ect of starting at an elite school on graduating within the theoretical
duration of the program. To address the potential self-selection of high ability students in
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elite schools, we use distance as an instrument for school choice. In this section, we rst
specify the potential outcomes and di¤erent treatment e¤ects. If the treatment e¤ect di¤ers
between students and depends on their willingness to select into treatment, Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005) show that the standard 2SLS estimator in a traditional IV analysis cannot
be interpreted as the ATT or ATE. We therefore follow two approaches that allow for a
heterogeneous treatment e¤ect. First, we discuss the nonparametric approach of Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005), see also Cornelissen et al. (2016a) for an overview on how to apply
this method. Finally, we show how parametric and distributional assumptions can overcome
support problems of the nonparametric approach and how the factor structure of Aakvik et
al. (2005) can give additional insights on the distribution of treatment e¤ects.
3.1 Potential outcomes and treatment e¤ects
Let Yi1 be the study outcome of student i in the case of treatment, starting at an elite
school, and Yi0 the outcome of student i if he started at a non-elite school. Let Di be equal
to one if a student started at an elite school and zero otherwise. For each student i, we only
observe the realized outcome in the observed state.
Yi = DiYi1 + (1 Di)Yi0 (1)
The potential study outcome in case of attending an elite school is
Yi1 = 1(Xi; Ui1); (2)
while the potential study outcome in case of no treatment is
Yi0 = 0(Xi; Ui0); (3)
where Xi is a vector of observed characteristics of students and Ui0 and Ui1 are unobserved
random variables.
From this model, we can obtain the commonly used treatment parameters:
 Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE):
ATE(x) = E[Y1   Y0jX = x]
 Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATT):
ATT (x) = E[Y1   Y0jX = x;D = 1]
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 Average Treatment E¤ect on the Non-Treated (ATNT):
ATNT (x) = E[Y1   Y0jX = x;D = 0]
With x the realization of the random variable X. These treatment e¤ects can then be
averaged over the empirical distribution of X to obtain one average treatment e¤ect.
3.2 Selection equation
Students choose an elite school if the following condition holds:
Di = 1(UiV  V (Xi; Zi)) (4)
= 1(FUV (UiV )  FUV (V (Xi; Zi))
= 1(UiD  Pr(Di = 1jXi;Zi))
with 1() an indicator function = 1 if the expression between brackets is true, V (Xi; Zi)
an arbitrary function of observed characteristics Xi and Zi that determine the utility of
starting at an elite school. UiV is the unobserved cost of treatment for student i and FUV
its cumulative distribution function (cdf). The probability normalization in (4) then allows
us to write selection into treatment as a function of the propensity score Pr(D = 1jX;Z)
and an unobserved cost of treatment that is by construction uniformly distributed: UD 
Uniform(0; 1), regardless of the unspecied distribution of UV . UD can also be interpreted
as the quantiles of UV .
In the rest of the paper we maintain the following assumptions on the instrument Z:
Condition 1 (Relevance) Z is a random variable such that the propensity score P (X;Z) 
Pr(D = 1jX;Z) is a nontrivial function of Z.
Condition 2 (Exogeneity (conditional on X)) Z is uncorrelated with U1 and U0 after
conditioning on X
These two conditions are similar to the standard 2SLS assumptions. The rst condition
assures that the instrument is strong. The second condition assures that the instrument has
no direct impact on study outcomes. Vytlacil (2002) also notes that the selection model in
(4) is equivalent to the monotonicity condition of the LATE literature (Imbens and Angrist,
1994). In our application this means that all students should perceive distance to school as
a cost and not as a benet.
11
3.3 Estimation
A common treatment e¤ect implies that the ATT is the same as the ATNT and that students
do not select themselves on the basis of expected returns from schooling. In this case, one
can estimate the treatment e¤ect using 2SLS. If this assumption is not satised, Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005) show that 2SLS does not estimate the ATT, ATE or ATNT and that
this estimate is then di¢ cult to interpret. To allow for heterogeneous e¤ects, we follow the
framework of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) by using marginal treatment e¤ects (MTE) as a
building block for nonparametric estimation of ATT, ATE and ATNT. While our data allows
for nonparametric estimation of the ATT, we have insu¢ cient common support to identify
ATNT or ATE. Furthermore we cannot identify how observable covariates can explain het-
erogeneity because common support that is conditional on observables, is more di¢ cult to
achieve. We therefore propose a parametric model, similar to Manski et al. (1992) with
limited functional form and distributional assumptions. Finally, we show how distributional
treatment e¤ects can be identied, using identifying assumptions of a factor model, proposed
by Aakvik et al. (2005).
3.3.1 Nonparametric approach
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) estimate MTEs to allow for a heterogeneous e¤ect and use
these estimates to compute the aforementioned treatment e¤ects. The MTE is the e¤ect of
attending an elite school for students with observable characteristics X = x and unobserved
cost of treatment UD = uD:
MTE(x;uD) = E[Y1   Y0jX = x; UD = uD]
Since the cost of treatment UD is by construction uniformly distributed between 0 and 1,
we can interpret the treatment e¤ect at low values of uD as the e¤ect for students that have
a low unobserved cost, i.e. a high unobserved preference for going to an elite school. The
e¤ect at high values is the e¤ect for students with high unobserved costs, or low unobserved
preferences. From the MTEs, we can derive the following average treatment e¤ects (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2005):
ATE(x) =
Z 1
0
MTE(x;uD)duD
ATT (x) =
1
E[P (X;ZjX = x)]
Z 1
0
MTE(x; uD) Pr(P (X;Z) > uDjX = x)duD (5)
ATNT (x) =
1
E[1  P (X;ZjX = x)]
Z 1
0
MTE(x; uD) Pr(P (X;Z)  uDjX = x)duD
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Estimation of the MTE can proceed using local IV with P (x;z)  P (X = x;Z = z) as
an instrument for Y in small neighborhoods around each value of P (x; z) (Heckman and
Vytlacil, 1999). This is because the MTE can also be interpreted as the treatment e¤ect
for students that are indi¤erent between elite and non-elite schools at di¤erent levels of the
propensity score. To identify the entire MTE(x; uD) function, we need su¢ cient observations
of both treated and non-treated students at each value of P (x; z):
Condition 3 (Common support) For each P (x; z), there should be treated and non-treated
individuals.
Since it is di¢ cult to achieve common support, conditional on observable characteristics
X, we ignore them in the nonparametric estimation. This implies that X gets absorbed by
the unobservables in the model and therefore the exclusion restriction of the instrument is
now stronger:
Condition 4 (Exogeneity (unconditional on X)) Z is uncorrelated with X, U1 and U0
This assumption makes Z independent of X and ignores the distinction between observed
and unobserved costs of treatment. In section 4 we show that we can nd MTE(uD) for all
uD < 0:6. This allows us to interpret how costs of treatment relate to treatment outcomes for
students with low costs, or high preferences, of going to an elite school. This is su¢ cient to
estimate the ATT because the weights in the calculation of the ATT ( 1
E[P (Z)]
Pr(P (Z) > uD))
are 0 for uD > 0:6.
Nevertheless our data do not allow to nonparametrically estimate the ATNT and ATE.
Nor does it tell us how observable characteristics contribute to the treatment e¤ects. We
therefore discuss a model that introduces limited functional form and distributional assump-
tions.
3.3.2 Parametric approach
To overcome the support conditions of nonparametric estimation, we follow Manski et al.
(1992) and specify a simple, yet exible model for going to an elite school and graduating
on time. Most importantly it does not impose a Roy model structure, i.e. students do not
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need to select on gains of treatment. We use the following functional form assumptions:
Di = Zi + Xi   UiV (6)
Di = 1 if Di  0 and Di = 0 otherwise
Y i0 = 0Xi   Ui0
Yi0 = 1 if Y i0  0 and Yi0 = 0 otherwise
Y i1 = 1Xi   Ui1
Yi1 = 1 if Y i1  0 and Yi1 = 0 otherwise
The model is then completed by assuming a distribution of U1, U0 and UV : We assume
that the error terms are jointly normal with a mean-zero vector and correlation matrix 
:

 =
0B@ 1 0 11 10
1
1CA (7)
Because Y1 and Y0 are never observed simultaneously, the joint distribution of (U1; U0)
and thus their correlation 10 is not identied. We can however estimate correlations between
U0 and UV : 0 and between U1 and UV : 1. Since the joint distribution of each outcome
equation and the selection equation is identied, we can calculate ATT, ATNT and ATE:
ATE(x) = Pr(Y1 = 1jX = x)  Pr(Y0 = 1jX = x) (8)
= (1x)  (0x)
With  the cdf of a normal distribution. Similarly we nd:
ATT (x) = EZ

2(1X; Z + X; 1)  2(0X; Z + X; 0)
(Z + X)
jX = x;D = 1

(9)
ATNT (x) = EZ

2(1X; Z   X; 1)  2(0X; Z   X; 0)
( Z   X) jX = x;D = 0

With 2 the cdf of a bivariate normal and EZ the expected value over the empirical
distribution of Z. Note that the average treatment parameters are identied for each possible
set of covariates x. We can average over the empirical distribution of X (possibly conditional
on treatment status) to recover the average e¤ects ATE, ATT and ATNT . Furthermore,
we can identify average marginal e¤ects by investigating how the treatment e¤ect di¤ers
when one covariate changes value. Note that all covariates are dummy variables, therefore
we calculate the marginal e¤ect of variable xk as:
EX [((1xxk=1)  (0xxk=1))  ((1xxk=0)  (0xxk=0))]
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With EX the expected value over the empirical distribution of X, xxk=1 is the observed
x vector with element xk replaced by 1, and xxk=0 the observed x vector with element xk
replaced by 0.
3.3.3 Distributional treatment e¤ects
While 10 was not needed for average e¤ects (see (8) and (9)), it is required to know more
about the distribution of treatment e¤ects. In particular, we investigate the percentage of
the students that would benet or su¤er from going to an elite school. The calculation of
these distributional treatment e¤ects requires additional structure on the covariances of the
error terms since Y1 and Y0 are never observed simultaneously. Aakvik et al. (2005) provide
a model to calculate distributional treatment e¤ects when the outcome variable is discrete.
In particular they discuss the e¤ects on a dichotomous outcome that is generated by an
underlying linear latent index. In this case, the individual treatment e¤ect can only take
three values. A student either benets from going to an elite school, su¤ers or experiences
no e¤ect. While individual treatment e¤ects remain unidentied, distributional treatment
e¤ects can be identied. One example is the percentage of students that would benet from
going to an elite school13:
E[ = 1jX = x] = Pr(Y0 = 0; Y1 = 1jX = x)
= Pr(Y1 = 1jX = x)  Pr(Y0 = 1; Y1 = 1jX = x)
= (X1)  2(X0; X1;10)
In order to calculate these distributional treatment e¤ects, we need to identify 10. There-
fore Aakvik et al. (2005) follow a similar structure as in (6) but instead of estimating
covariances between error terms, they impose the following factor structure:
UiV =  i + "iD (10)
Ui0 =  0i + "i0
Ui1 =  1i + "i1
with ; "D; "0 and "1 all independently distributed. I.e. correlation between error terms
enters exclusively through one common factor i.14
13See Aakvik et al. (2005) for other distributional treatment parameters. We also calculate the proportion
of students that would benet among the treated and among the non-treated.
14One can think of i as unobserved ability or di¤erences in school environment.
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One particular case is where ; "D; "0 and "1 are all normally distributed. In this case,
the model is a identical to the one we proposed in the previous subsection15 and has the
following correlation structure:
0 =
0p
2
p
1 + 20
1 =
1p
2
p
1 + 21
Note that the estimated correlations 0 and 1 are simply transformations of the factor
loadings 0 and 1. More importantly, the previously unidentied correlation, 10, is now
identied as it only depends on the two factor loadings:
10 =
01p
1 + 20
p
1 + 21
= 201
Provided that there is a solution for 0 and 1, the factor structure identies 10 in our
model. This identity can then be used to calculate distributional treatment e¤ects. Note
that this factor structure was only needed to identify 10 and therefore has not impact on
the estimates of ATT, ATNT, ATE or marginal e¤ects.
To estimate this model, we proceed as follows: we rst estimate (6) with error structure
(7) using maximum likelihood16 to estimate all parameters in (6) and 0 and 1. We then
calculate ATT, ATNT, ATE and average marginal e¤ects of observed characteristics. We
subsequently test if the estimates of 0 and 1 have a solution for 0 and 1 and then
calculate 10 = 201. This allows us to also calculate distributional e¤ects.
4 Discussion of the instrument
We use the relative distance to an elite school as an instrument for school choice. The relative
distance is the distance to the closest non-elite high school, subtracted by the distance to
the closest elite high school17. The use of geographical variation as an instrument for school
15Note that normalizations are di¤erent. Instead of (implicitly) normalizing the variances of UiD, Ui0, and
Ui1 to be 1, the model of Aakvik et. al (2005) implies variances of respectively 2, 20 + 1 and 
2
1 + 1. I.e.
our estimates should be multiplied by the square roots of these numbers to translate them to their model.
16We estimate the model in STATA using the user-written command switch_probit(Lokshin and Sajaia,
2011).
17We observe the location of the students at the level of the statistical sector. In Belgium, each munici-
pality is divided into several statistical sectors. Belgium consists of 19 781 statistical sectors (Vademecum
Statistische sectoren, 2012). Statistical sectors have a surface of on average 1.54 km2 and on average 539
inhabitants. To construct our instrument, we compute the distance from the center of the statistical sector
to the exact location of the school.
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choice has been proposed by Card (1995) and has also been used by other studies in the
educational literature, see for example Barrow et al. (2015), Cullen et al. (2015) and
Carneiro et al. (2016). In this section, we provide a discussion of the three assumptions
of the instrument: relevance, exogeneity and common support. Note that also a fourth
assumption, monotonicity, was implied by the selection model 4. As discussed in section 3.2,
this implies that all students must perceive distance as a cost and not as a benet.
4.1 Relevance
The rst assumption implies that distance should have a strong impact on school choice.
Table 2 shows the results of the rst stage of a 2SLS regression. The relative distance has
the expected positive sign and is highly signicant, resulting in a high F-statistic of the
exclusion restriction. Students (or their parents) are sensitive to distances to schools when
making the choice to go to an elite high school as an additional kilometer to a non-elite high
school (or an equal reduction in the distance to the elite school) makes them 3.4% points
more likely to choose the elite school.
Table 2: First stage: choosing for an elite school
(1) (2)
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.034* (0.001) 0.032* (0.001)
Mother no high school degreea -0.215* (0.004)
Mother high school degreea -0.145* (0.003)
No dutch at home 0.056* (0.006)
Low income -0.046* (0.003)
Male -0.016* (0.002)
Constant 0.350* (0.004) 0.460* (0.005)
Observations 218,211 218,211
R-squared 0.073 0.116
F-stat excl. instr. 1697 1711
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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This result remains stable when controlling for observed student characteristics. This is
what we would expect from a valid instrument. The control variables do already indicate
that selection into elite schools is non-random as disadvantaged students are less likely to
choose for elite schools. The only exception is students who do not speak Dutch at home as
they are more likely to choose an elite school but they also have lower expected outcomes.18
4.2 Exogeneity
The second condition (exogeneity) implies that the instrument should not be correlated
with unobservables that determine the outcome equation. Exogeneity of an instrument is
an untestable assumption and is usually justied on institutional grounds. In our case,
di¤erences in distances cannot be correlated with unobservables in the success equation.
This implies that parents are expected to ignore the school environment in their location
choice. In a similar way, schools that o¤er better education must not locate themselves in
areas with better students. First, we argue based on institutional grounds that distance to
schools is an exogenous instrument for school choice in Flanders. Second, we assess how the
estimation of the treatment e¤ect would change if the instrument would be correlated with
unobservables in the outcome equation.
While distances can be problematic in a lot of institutional contexts, we argue that this is
not the case in Flanders.19 School choice is free and most students live close to several schools
(see Table A1 in appendix A). Students can choose between 827 schools in Flanders. For the
median student, six schools are located within 5 km distance.20 Students can also benet
from cheap public transportation or bike roads, the most common means of transportation
for high school students. So while distances can be large enough for students to inuence
their school choice, it is unlikely that it would inuence moving decisions. Moreover, schools
are not expected to di¤er so much in their quality because of government imposed curricula
and similar public nancing. So while we still expect and investigate di¤erences between
schools, we do not expect them to be large enough to cover moving costs.
However, if there would still be some correlation between the instrument and the unob-
servables determining study success, it would be informative to assess the direction of the
18A possible explanation is that this variable groups pupils from very diverse migrant backgrounds, both
low and high skilled, and is therefore di¢ cult to interpret. While low skilled migration was very common in
Flanders for industrial production during the 20th century, also high skilled migration is important because
of Flandersproximity to Brussels, the capital of the European Union.
19Altonji et al. (2005) show that distance is not a valid instrument to identify the e¤ect of attending a
catholic high school using data from the U.S.
20In section 8 we provide a sensitivity analysis where we restrict the sample to students living in areas
with many schools and we obtain similar results.
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potential bias and assess how sensitive our results are towards deviations from the exogene-
ity assumption. If the instrument Z is correlated with the unobservables in the outcome
equation ", the e¤ect of elite schooling  will be biased. To evaluate the direction of this
bias, note that the probability limit of the 2SLS estimator ^ is:
p lim ^ = +
Corr(Zi; "i)
Corr(Zi; Di)
p
V ar("i)p
V ar(Di)
(11)
So the sign of the bias is positive if sign(Corr(Zi; "i)) = sign(Corr(Zi; Di)) and negative
otherwise. We argue that it is more likely that the sign of the potential bias is positive, so that
in case our instrument is endogenous, we would overestimate the benets or underestimate
the losses from treatment. First, we nd that the denominator of the bias is positive as
the instrument is positively correlated with the treatment indicator. Second, we expect
Corr(Zi; "i) to be positive. This positive correlation arises if (1) parents of students with
higher ability locate themselves in the neighborhood of elite schools or (2) elite schools locate
themselves in the neighborhood of high-ability students.21 As the MTE approach proceeds
by using local IV, a similar intuition holds for the results in which we allow treatment e¤ects
to di¤er among individuals. Since one of our main results is that the ATT of going to an
elite school is negative, it can thus be interpreted as a conservative estimate.
4.3 Common support
This last condition implies that for each value of the propensity score P (z), there should
be treated and non-treated individuals. We estimate the propensity score using a probit
regression and plot the histogram of common support in Figure 1. The common support
assumption is satised for values of P (z) below 0.6. This allows us to identify the MTE
for values of uD below 0.6. For higher values of P (z), there are almost no treated or non-
treated students22. From (5) it is clear that this allows us to compute the ATT but not
the other two treatment e¤ects. This is because the weights in the calculation of the ATT
( 1
E[P (Z)]
Pr(P (Z) > uD)) become 0 for uD > 0:6.23 Therefore we do not need estimates of
the MTE for uD > 0:6 and thus we do not need common support at P (z) > 0:6. We plot
the weights in Figure A1 in Appendix A. The ATT attaches more weight to students with
low costs of treatment (low uD) as they are more likely to select into treatment. Note that
21Table A1 also shows that the di¤erences in distance based on observable characteristics are small.
22Each percentile below 0.6 contains at least 50 treated and 50 non-treated students. For most percentiles
above 0.6 this condition is not satised.
23In practice the weights are non-zero but small but we set them equal to zero for values of P (z) larger
than 0.6 (see Figure A1).
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this support condition is no longer necessary in the parametric approach as the parametric
and distributional assumptions allow for the identication of the entire distribution of po-
tential outcomes and the selection probability (as well as the entire MTE as a function of
unobservables).
Figure 1: Common support
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Note: This gure represents the number of treated and non-treated students for each percentile
of the propensity score.
5 Empirical results
We rst compare the results of simple OLS and 2SLS regressions. Next, we account for both
self-selection and heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and derive the corresponding average treat-
ment e¤ects. We show how the average treatment e¤ects vary with personal characteristics
and compute the fraction of students that benets or su¤ers from elite schools.
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5.1 Traditional IV analysis
Table 3 represents the results of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. The rst specication
only includes our variable of interest, starting at an elite school. There is a positive e¤ect
on the probability of nishing high school without study delay. This e¤ect decreases when
controlling for background characteristics such as gender and socio-economic status. This
decrease in the coe¢ cient can be explained by selection on observed characteristics. If more
advantaged students choose for elite schools, omitting background characteristics will lead
to an upward bias of the treatment e¤ect.
The OLS regressions do not take into account selection based on unobserved characteris-
tics. If high ability students are more likely to attend elite schools, the e¤ect of elite schooling
will be overestimated. When we control for self-selection, we nd a signicantly negative
e¤ect. When adding control variables in the last specication, the 2SLS estimate remains
almost the same, further suggesting that the instrument is exogenous without conditioning
on observables.
Table 3: obtain a HS degree within 6 years
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Elite school 0.072* (0.003) 0.037* (0.003) -0.091* (0.014) -0.108* (0.012)
Mother no high schoola -0.174* (0.003) -0.206* (0.005)
Mother high schoola -0.085* (0.002) -0.107* (0.003)
No dutch at home -0.192* (0.006) -0.179* (0.006)
Low income -0.042* (0.003) -0.049* (0.003)
Male -0.141* (0.002) -0.143* (0.002)
Constant 0.701* (0.002) 0.867* (0.002) 0.745* (0.004) 0.923* (0.005)
Observations 218,211 218,211 218,211 218,211
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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5.2 Heterogeneous treatment e¤ects
If treatment e¤ects are the same for everyone, the 2SLS method estimates this e¤ect to be
-10.8% points. This average would be the same for treated and non-treated individuals. How-
ever, if treatment e¤ects are heterogeneous and selection of schools by students is inuenced
by this heterogeneity, we do not estimate any of the relevant treatment parameters. We rst
discuss the results of the MTE estimates of the nonparametric model. We nonparametrically
estimate the ATT using MTEs and compare this estimate to the corresponding estimate,
resulting from the parametric model we imposed in section 3.3.2. We use this model to
further investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect.
5.2.1 Marginal Treatment E¤ects
In Figure 2, we represent the estimation of the marginal treatment e¤ects of starting at an
elite school.24 In the estimation of the MTEs, we do not include control variables, similar
to specications (1) and (3) in Table 3. This allows for easier interpretation of the results
and is valid under the assumption that the instrument is exogenous. On the horizontal axis,
we represent uD, which can be interpreted as the cost of treatment. Students with a low
uD have a low cost or a high preference for elite schools and are therefore more likely to be
treated.
Figure 2 shows that the treatment e¤ect is not constant, but di¤ers between individuals
with a di¤erent cost of treatment. Therefore it is di¢ cult to assess what treatment e¤ect was
identied by 2SLS in the previous subsection. The slope of the MTE is in itself of interest. If
students would select on the basis of unobserved expected gains, we would expect a downward
sloping MTE curve, because students with a low cost of treatment (for example high-ability
students) would benet more from the treatment. However, we nd an increasing marginal
treatment e¤ect for a large part of the graph, especially in the area that is estimated most
precisely. This implies that students who have a high preference for elite schools, experience
a more negative treatment e¤ect.
24We follow Doyle (2007) and use the bandwidth that minimizes the sum of squared errors between the
local quadratic estimator and a fourth-degree polynomial model.
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Figure 2: MTE of elite schools to graduate on time
Note: MTEs are calculated using a local polynomial regression of degree 2 with
an Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.117). Standard errors are computed with a
bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical sector.
No results for uD > 0:60 due to insu¢ cient common support.
5.2.2 Average and distributional treatment e¤ects
ATT, ATNT and ATE
Table 4 compares the estimates of the average treatment e¤ects for the di¤erent models.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show that MTEs can be used to compute more interesting
treatment e¤ects such as the ATT, ATNT and ATE. In order to be able to compute these
three di¤erent treatment e¤ects, the common support assumption should be satised. In
general this assumption is di¢ cult to satisfy in nonparametric estimation. Nevertheless, as
explained in section 4, we are able to identify an ATT of -0.116. On average, students in
elite schools experienced an 11.6 %points decrease in their probability to obtain a degree.
Note that the estimated ATT is close to the 2SLS estimate but this is merely coincidental.
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Table 4: Treatment e¤ects: obtaining a high school degree without study delay
Traditional IV Nonparametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment e¤ects
ATT -0.108* (0.012) -0.116* (0.024) -0.107* (0.010)
ATNT -0.108* (0.012) Not identieda 0.015 (0.014)
ATE -0.108* (0.012) Not identieda -0.018 (0.011)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Not identied due to insu¢ cient common support
Despite the extra structure imposed in the third column of Table 4, the estimate of
the ATT ( 10:7%points) is very similar to the MTE approach of Heckman and Vytlacil
( 11:6%points).25 The parametric model also allows us to compute the ATE and ATNT.
We derive a non-signicantly ATE of -2.2 %points and a positive, but non-signicant ATNT
of 0.7 %points. These estimates conrm our interpretation of the increasing MTE in Figure
2 in the previous section: the e¤ect of starting at elite schools is more negative for those
students with the highest preference, i.e. the students who actually choose these schools.
Average marginal e¤ects of student characteristics
To gain more insights in the way the treatment e¤ect di¤ers among observable student
characteristics, we report the average marginal e¤ects of each background variable in Table
5. As these are all dummy variables, we look at the e¤ect of a change from 0 to 1 for each
variable. As these e¤ects di¤er between individuals, we evaluate them for each student in
the sample at their actual realizations of all other variables and report the mean e¤ect.
All background characteristics that predicted worse study outcomes26 also predict a more
negative treatment e¤ect. Most of these variables also have a negative e¤ect on predicting
self-selection into elite schools. Nevertheless, we found that the ATT is more negative than
the ATNT, suggesting worse outcomes for those who selected into treatment. This can then
25The results of the parameters in (6) can be found in Table A2 in Appendix A. We also ran a model
without observable characteristics X and obtained very similar results.
26This can be concluded from the signs of coe¢ cients in Table A2 and is consistent with the results we
found for the simple OLS and IV models in Table 3.
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only be explained by the e¤ect of unobservable characteristics that make students enter elite
schools but also make them have worse outcomes of elite schools.
Table 5: Average marginal e¤ects and distributional e¤ects
Coef. St. error
Average marginal e¤ects of student background
Mother has no high school degreea -0.016 (0.011)
Mother has high school degreea -0.009 (0.007)
No Dutch at home -0.023* (0.011)
Low income -0.018* (0.007)
Male -0.022* (0.006)
Distributional treatment e¤ectsb
Among all students
% benet from elite school 16.7* (0.4)
% su¤er from elite school 18.5* (0.8)
Among students in elite school
% benet from elite school 8.4* (0.7)
% su¤er from elite school 19.1* (0.3)
Among student in non-elite school
% benet from elite school 19.7* (0.7)
% su¤er from elite school 18.3* (0.9)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Distributional
e¤ects derived by accept-reject simulation of error terms with 100 draws for each
student in each bootstrap sample.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
b Requires identication of 10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005)
Distributional treatment e¤ects
The extra structure imposed by the factor model of Aakvik et al. (2005) is necessary
to compute distributional treatment e¤ects. Distributional treatment e¤ects are another
measure of the heterogeneity of the treatment e¤ect and identify the fraction of students
who experienced or would have experienced (in case of no treatment) a positive or negative
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treatment e¤ect. The second panel of Table 5 shows the distributional treatment e¤ects for
the total population of students, the group of students who started at elite schools, and the
group of students who started at non-elite schools. In total, 16.7% of the students benets
from starting at an elite school and 18.5% experiences a negative e¤ect. Although we found
a negative ATT in Table 4, the distributional treatment e¤ects show that among the group
of treated students, 8.4% still experienced a positive treatment e¤ect. These students would
not have graduated on time if they had started at a non-elite school. From the group of
non-treated students, a larger fraction of 19.3% would have been better o¤ at an elite school.
This heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects implies that a policy aiming to increase the num-
ber of students graduating on time should optimally allocate students to elite and non-elite
schools, rather than banning elite schools. A rst-best policy that assigns students to the
type of school in which they have the highest probability of success would increase the total
percentage of students graduating on time from 72:0% to 91:6%, while a policy that bans
elite schools entirely only increases it to 74:9%.27 Note however that this rst-best policy is
infeasible as it is di¢ cult to identify the students su¤ering from going to an elite school.
6 Interpretation of results
The combination of a negative ATT and a small and non-signicant ATNT in Table 4 implies
that the treatment e¤ect is on average more negative for the students who actually started at
an elite school. Students who did not choose for an elite school would on average experience
no e¤ect from the treatment. The upward sloping MTE curve in Figure 2 also shows that
students with a high preference for elite schools (left side of the graph) experience a more
negative treatment e¤ect. However, if students would select on the basis of unobserved gains,
we would expect a downward sloping MTE curve and ATT>ATNT.28
An elite school only o¤ers academic programs, while non-elite schools o¤er more pro-
grams. Tracking decisions may therefore be di¤erent in these two types of schools. When
students start at an elite school, they have to switch to another school if they do not want to
27The total graduation rate without study delay is the weighted average of the rate of an elite school
(77.3%) and that of a non-elite school (70.1%): 26.6% x 77.3% + 73.4% x 70.1%=72.0%. If everyone would
go to a non-elite school, students in elite schools would on average have a 10.7% points (=ATT) higher
outcome: 26.6% x (77.3%+10.7%) + 73.4% x 70.1%=74.9%. If all students would start at the school in
which they have the highest probability of success, success rates would increase to: 26.6% x (77.3%+19.1%)
+73.4% x (70.1%+19.7%)=91.6%.
28Reverse selection on unobserved gains is not uncommon in the literature as it has also been established
in Aakvik et al. (2005) on the e¤ects of a rehabilitation program on employment and Cornelissen et al.
(2016b) on the e¤ects of universal child care on school outcomes.
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follow the academic track. If switching to another school is costly, students in an elite school
have an extra incentive to follow the academic track. Dustmann et al. (2016) also nd that
within an early tracking system, the possibility to change tracks over time is important to
mitigate negative long-term e¤ects of tracking. Table 1 shows that students who started at
an elite school were more likely to choose for the academic track. The fact that some of
these students would have been better o¤ in another track, can explain their lower perfor-
mance in elite schools. In the next section we empirically verify this hypothesis. Especially
the students with a high preference for elite schools might be unwilling to switch to other
schools during the course of their high school education, even if the academic track does
not suit them well. Therefore, they will be more likely to accumulate study delay or risk to
graduate without a degree, instead of switching schools. Note that this high preference does
not necessarily need to apply to the student. They can also be pushed by their parents to
go to and stay in an elite school.
An alternative explanation for a negative treatment e¤ect is that choosing a better school
also causes negative behavioral responses by parents and peers. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola
(2013) nd that parents of children who make it into elite schools often reduce their e¤ort in
helping them. The authors also nd that relatively weak students in better-ranked schools
feel more marginalized and insecure than similar students in other schools. While they still
nd a positive e¤ect on educational outcomes, it is possible that these side-e¤ects in our
context tip the balance towards a negative e¤ect.
A negative e¤ect can also be explained by di¤erences in grading standards and demands
from students. Schools have some autonomy in deciding about grade retention and excluding
students from certain programs. It is therefore possible that elite schools more often require
weaker students to repeat a grade in order to achieve the required schooling level.
We nd that there is substantial heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect. First, the av-
erage treatment e¤ect di¤ers between treated and non-treated students. Second, within
both groups of treated and non-treated students, the treatment e¤ect also di¤ers between
students. Some students benet, while others su¤er from treatment. Table 5 shows that ob-
served student characteristics explain part of this heterogeneity. However, also unobserved
di¤erences between students and schools can result in heterogeneous treatment e¤ects.
7 Alternative outcome variables
In this section we repeat the analysis for two additional outcome variables to give more
insights into the interpretation of our results. All results are represented in Appendix B.
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7.1 Graduating with at most one year of study delay
Our main results indicate that students starting at elite schools are on average less likely to
graduate on time. If graduating from an elite school has positive e¤ects on success in higher
education or in the labor market, it might be benecial to persist in elite schools even if
it takes one year longer to graduate from high school. If students value graduating from
elite schools more and are therefore willing to study one year longer, we would expect a less
negative e¤ect of elite schooling on the probability of obtaining a degree with at most one
year of study delay.
We therefore repeat the analysis for this alternative outcome variable. In Figure A3, we
still nd an upward sloping marginal treatment e¤ect. Table A3 summarizes the treatment
e¤ects derived from the three approaches. We still derive a signicantly negative ATT of
-0.046, implying that students who started at elite schools are on average less likely to obtain
a high school degree within 7 years of studying. However, this e¤ect is smaller compared
with the previous outcome variable. This seems to suggest that some, but not all students
are willing to graduate with one year of study delay in order to obtain a degree from an elite
school.
7.2 Switching tracks
A possible explanation for the negative ATT is that within an elite school, it is more di¢ cult
for students to choose the track that corresponds best with their ability because only the
academic track is o¤ered within these schools. To test this hypothesis, we repeat the analysis
with a di¤erent outcome variable: the probability to switch to a lower track, or downgrade,
during high school. We dene downgrading as a switch from either the academic track to
another track or from the technical or arts track to the vocational track. Downgrading is
common in the Flemish education system. 27% of students starting in elite schools down-
grade at least once during secondary education. In non-elite schools, a larger fraction of
35% downgraded at least once. Downgrading can help students switch to a di¤erent track,
without having to repeat a grade. However, for students who started at elite schools, this
implies not only a switch of tracks but also a switch of schools. If there are school switching
costs, going to an elite school makes students less willing to switch to other tracks.
The estimated MTE for the probability to downgrade is given in Figure A3. Note that
this looks remarkably similar to the MTE for graduating without study delay (Figure 2).
We derive a similar ATT of -0.086, i.e. elite schools decrease the probability of downgrading
during secondary education. Moreover, especially those students with a low cost of going
to an elite school (left side of the graph) are less likely to downgrade. These are the same
28
students that were less likely to graduate on time, when choosing for elite schools. Their
high preference for the elite school makes them prepared to stay in the academic track, even
though they might fail and accumulate study delay.
8 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we assess how sensitive our results are to the chosen sample of students. First,
we restrict the sample to students for which the exogeneity condition of the instrument is
most likely to hold. Second, we change the control group (i.e. students in non-elite schools)
and include only students in schools that o¤er an academic track. All results are represented
in Appendix C.
8.1 Exogeneity of the instrument
Based on institutional grounds, we argued that distance is an exogenous instrument for
school choice in Flanders. School choice is essentially free. For most students several schools
are located within commuting distance. From our dataset, we computed that for the me-
dian student, six schools are located within 5 km distance. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that parents would base their location decision on preferences for certain schools. If our
instrument would not be exogenous, we expect this violation of the exogeneity assumption
to be stronger in areas with less school alternatives. We therefore repeat the analysis and
restrict the sample to students living in areas with many schools. In Appendix C, we assess
this issue and repeat the analysis on a subsample of the data where we only include students
who have at least four schooling options, located within 5 km distance. The MTE curve in
Figure A4 still shows an upward sloping MTE. We nd a similar negative ATT of -0.126. In
the parametric model, we nd a negative ATT of -0.087 (Table A7), and a positive ATNT
of 0.044. The latter is slightly larger than in our base model and signicant at the 5% level.
8.2 Composition of non-elite schools
There exist two di¤erent types of non-elite schools. The rst type are general schools that
o¤er programs in the academic track in combination with technical, artistic or vocational
programs. Most rst year students (60.3%) enroll at this type of schools. The second type of
schools specialize in technical, artistic and/or vocational programs and do not o¤er academic
programs. These schools only have a small share of rst year enrollment (13.1%). As students
who start at a non-elite school without programs in the academic track can be di¤erent from
students who start at the rst type of non-elite schools, we repeat the analysis and only
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include students who started at an elite school and students who started at a non-elite school
that also o¤ers the academic track. We obtain very similar results as in the main analysis.
We again nd that the treatment e¤ect is heterogeneous and that students who started at
elite schools su¤ered the most as suggested by the upward sloping MTE curve in Figure A5
and the negative ATT between -0.103 (nonparametric model) and -0.096 (parametric model)
and a positive ATNT of 0.046 in Table A9.
9 Conclusion
We have studied how the organizational structure of schools inuences success in an early-
tracking system in secondary education. We compared within- and between-school tracking
and analyzed whether students starting at elite schools, schools that specialize and only o¤er
programs in the academic track, are more likely to obtain their high school degree without
study delay. We controlled for self-selection of students and allowed for heterogeneous treat-
ment e¤ects. We applied our analysis to the region of Flanders.
We nd that there is substantial heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect of choosing for an
elite school, both within and between treatment groups. Although we nd a small and non-
signicant ATE, students with a high preference for elite schools experience large negative
e¤ects. We derive an ATT of -11.6 %points, i.e. students starting at elite schools experienced
on average an 11.6 %points decrease in their probability to graduate from high school without
study delay. This negative e¤ect can be explained by tracking decisions. We nd that
students are less likely to switch to another track when they started at an elite school
because they then have to switch to another school. This interference of school choice with
optimal tracking can explain the negative result.
The results have important implications for school assignment policies. The negative
ATT implies that banning elite schools would increase the overall rate of students graduating
on time. However, the additional result that within the groups of treated and non-treated
students a substantial fraction benets or su¤ers from elite schools, implies that more gains
are possible with a policy that optimally allocates students to elite and non-elite schools.
This rst best policy might be impossible to achieve in practice as students who would
benet or su¤er from attending an elite school are di¢ cult to identify. Better provision of
information could help students and their parents.
Further research is needed to consider the e¤ects of elite schools on other outcomes like
success in higher education or on the labor market. It is possible that the extra time in high
school is worth the cost of going to an elite school if later life outcomes are also a¤ected.
The substantial amount of treatment heterogeneity also suggests that for many students,
30
the elite school can be the best option. A potential explanation is heterogeneity in school
quality. Further research could address the reasons behind this heterogeneity.
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Appendix A: Additional tables and gures
Table A1: Distance to elite schools and pupilsbackground
Relative distance
all -2.6
male -2.6
female -2.5
mother has post high school degree -2.3
mother has high school degree -2.7
mother has no high school degree -2.7
dutch at home -2.6
no dutch at home -1.8
high income -2.5
low income -2.7
Note: Relative distance is the distance to the closest non-elite school minus the
distance to the closest elite school and is expressed in km.
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Figure A1: Weights for the calculation of the ATT
Note: The weights for the calculation of the ATT given by equation (5). For values above
0.6, we estimated the weights to be smaller then 0.016, but we set them equal to 0
because the MTE is not identied in this region.
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Table A2: Selection and outcome equations
Selection equation Outcome equations
elite school non-elite school
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.158* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.738* (0.012) -0.628* (0.025) -0.592* (0.013)
Mother high schoola -0.453* (0.009) -0.342* (0.017) -0.320* (0.009)
No dutch at home 0.187* (0.020) -0.527* (0.027) -0.469* (0.018)
Low income -0.174* (0.010) -0.183* (0.018) -0.132* (0.009)
Male -0.053* (0.007) -0.487* (0.012) -0.427* (0.007)
Constant 0.019 (0.013) 1.226* (0.030) 1.216* (0.014)
1 0.036 (0.029)
0 0.353* (0.028)
Log likelihood -232,591
Observations 218,211
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a parametric model where we assume that the error terms are jointly normally distributed. We
estimated the model with the user written "switch_probit" command (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011).
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Appendix B: Alternative outcome variables
Graduating with at most one year of study delay
Figure A2: MTE of elite schools to graduate with at most one year of study delay
Note: MTEs are calculated using a local polynomial regression of degree 2 with
an Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.109). Standard errors are are computed with
a bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical sector.
No results for uD > 0:60 due to insu¢ cient common support.
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Table A3: Treatment e¤ects (graduate with at most one year of study delay)
Traditional IV Nonparametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment e¤ects
ATT -0.070* (0.009) -0.046* (0.016) -0.067* (0.005)
ATNT -0.070* (0.009) Not identieda 0.022* (0.010)
ATE -0.070* (0.009) Not identieda -0.001 (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Not identied due to insu¢ cient common support
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Table A4: Additional results (graduate with at most one year of study delay)
Coef. St. error
Average marginal e¤ects of student background
Mother has no high school degreea 0.016 (0.011)
Mother has high school degreea 0.005 (0.005)
No Dutch at home -0.030* (0.010)
Low income -0.012* (0.005)
Male -0.014* (0.005)
Distributional treatment e¤ectsb
Among all students
% benet from elite school 8.8* (0.2)
% su¤er from elite school 8.9* (0.7)
Among students in elite school
% benet from elite school 1.9* (0.4)
% su¤er from elite school 8.6* (0.2)
Among student in non-elite school
% benet from elite school 11.3* (0.3)
% su¤er from elite school 9.1* (0.8)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Distributional
e¤ects derived by accept-reject simulation of error terms with 100 draws for each
student in each bootstrap sample.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
b Requires identication of 10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005)
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Switching track
Figure A3: MTE of elite schools to switch tracks
Note: MTEs are calculated using a local polynomial regression of degree 2 with
an Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.189). Standard errors are are computed with
a bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical sector.
No results for uD > 0:60 due to insu¢ cient common support.
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Table A5: Treatment e¤ects (switch tracks)
Traditional IV Nonparametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment e¤ects
ATT -0.067* (0.011) -0.086* (0.018) -0.087* (0.012)
ATNT -0.067* (0.011) Not identieda -0.007 (0.014)
ATE -0.067* (0.011) Not identieda -0.028* (0.011)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Not identied due to insu¢ cient common support
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Table A6: Additional results (switch tracks)
Coef. St. error
Average marginal e¤ects of student background
Mother has no high school degreea 0.108* (0.011)
Mother has high school degreea 0.060* (0.008)
No Dutch at home -0.048* (0.010)
Low income 0.038* (0.007)
Male 0.064* (0.005)
Distributional treatment e¤ectsb
Among all students
% benet from elite school 20.3* (0.7)
% su¤er from elite school 23.1* (0.5)
Among students in elite school
% benet from elite school 16.6* (0.3)
% su¤er from elite school 25.4* (0.8)
Among student in non-elite school
% benet from elite school 21.6* (1.0)
% su¤er from elite school 22.3* (0.5)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Distributional
e¤ects derived by accept-reject simulation of error terms with 100 draws for each
student in each bootstrap sample.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
b Requires identication of 10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005)
43
Appendix C: Sensitivity analysis
Exogeneity of the instrument
Figure A4: MTE of elite schools (exogeneity of the instrument)
Note: MTEs are calculated using a local polynomial regression of degree 2 with
an Epanechnikov kernel (bandwith 0.084). Standard errors are are computed with
a bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical sector.
No results for uD > 0:56 due to insu¢ cient common support.
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Table A7: Treatment e¤ects (exogeneity of the instrument)
Traditional IV Nonparametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment e¤ects
ATT -0.085* (0.015) -0.126* (0.030) -0.087* (0.014)
ATNT -0.085* (0.015) Not identieda 0.044* (0.018)
ATE -0.085* (0.015) Not identieda 0.007 (0.014)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Not identied due to insu¢ cient common support
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Table A8: Additional results (exogeneity of the instrument)
Coef. St. error
Average marginal e¤ects of student background
Mother has no high school degreeb -0.005 (0.013)
Mother has high school degreeb -0.001 (0.008)
No Dutch at home -0.009 (0.013)
Low income -0.020* (0.008)
Male -0.015* (0.006)
Distributional treatment e¤ectsc
Among all students
% benet from elite school 18.6* (0.5)
% su¤er from elite school 18.0* (0.8)
Among students in elite school
% benet from elite school 10.8* (0.9)
% su¤er from elite school 19.5* (0.4)
Among student in non-elite school
% benet from elite school 21.7* (0.7)
% su¤er from elite school 17.4* (0.8)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Distributional
e¤ects derived by accept-reject simulation of error terms with 100 draws for each
student in each bootstrap sample.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a An advantaged student is dened as a student with all dummy variables equal to 0,
this means a female, advantaged student that started high school at the age of 12.
b Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
c Requires identication of 10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005)
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Composition of non-elite schools
Figure A5: MTE of elite schools (composition of non-elite schools)
Note: MTEs are calculated using a local polynomial regression of degree 2 with
an Epanechnikov kernel (bandwidth 0.145). Standard errors are computed with a
bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical sector.
No results for uD > 0:68 due to insu¢ cient common support.
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Table A9: Treatment e¤ects (composition of non-elite schools)
Traditional IV Nonparametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment e¤ects
ATT -0.098* (0.011) -0.103* (0.020) -0.096* (0.009)
ATNT -0.098* (0.011) Not identieda 0.046* (0.011)
ATE -0.098* (0.011) Not identieda 0.002 (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a Not identied due to insu¢ cient common support
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Table A10: Additional results (composition of non-elite schools)
Coef. St. error
Average marginal e¤ects of student background
Mother has no high school degreeb 0.010 (0.009)
Mother has high school degreeb 0.006 (0.006)
No Dutch at home -0.029* (0.013)
Low income -0.005 (0.007)
Male -0.010* (0.005)
Distributional treatment e¤ectsc
Among all students
% benet from elite school 17.3* (0.4)
% su¤er from elite school 18.9* (0.6)
Among students in elite school
% benet from elite school 9.3* (0.6)
% su¤er from elite school 18.9* (0.3)
Among student in non-elite school
% benet from elite school 20.8* (0.5)
% su¤er from elite school 16.2* (0.6)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Distributional
e¤ects derived by accept-reject simulation of error terms with 100 draws for each
student in each bootstrap sample.
* statistical signicance at 5% level.
a An advantaged student is dened as a student with all dummy variables equal to 0,
this means a female, advantaged student that started high school at the age of 12.
b Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
c Requires identication of 10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005)
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